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Privacy-Preserving Screen Capture:
Closing the Loop for Medical Informatics UsabilityI
Joseph Cooley1, Sean Smith∗
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Abstract
As information technology permeates healthcare (particularly provider-facing
systems), maximizing system effectiveness requires the ability to document
and analyze tricky or troublesome usage scenarios. However, real-world med-
ical applications are typically replete with privacy-sensitive data regarding
patients, diagnoses, clinicians, and EMR user interface details; any instru-
mentation for screen capture (capturing and recording the scenario depicted
on the screen) needs to respect these privacy constraints. Furthermore, real-
world medical informatics systems are typically composed of modules from
many sources, mission-critical and often closed-source; any instrumentation
for screen capture cannot rely on access to structured output or software
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internals.
In this paper, we present a solution: a system that combines keyboard
video mouse (KVM) capture with automatic text redaction (and interac-
tively selectable unredaction) to produce precise technical content that can
enrich stakeholder communications and improve end-user influence on sys-
tem evolution. KVM-based capture makes our system both application and
operating-system independent because it eliminates software-interface depen-
dencies on capture targets. Using a corpus of EMR screenshots, we present
empirical measurements of redaction effectiveness and processing latency to
demonstrate system performances. We discuss how these techniques can
translate into instrumentation systems that improve real-world medical in-
formatics deployments.
Keywords: EHR/EMR, security, privacy, usability, redaction
1. Introduction
Medical enterprises large and small are supplanting paper-based systems
with IT-based ones, and upgrading old, piecemeal IT-based systems with
new, federated ones. However, as with any large engineering project, it is
unlikely that the first solution produced and deployed is exactly right. Stan-
dard engineering tenets teach the importance of “closing the loop”; under-
standing and tuning a system requires measuring it, in order for this tuning
to be a data-driven process.
However, when it comes to taking such measurements, medical informat-
ics systems raise a unique combination of challenges:
Privacy Preservation In a human-facing IT system, screenshots comprise
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the natural domain for measurement. However, in medical systems,
screenshots are full of privacy-sensitive material. First, we have the
obvious issues: names and identifying information of patients; images
of patients; text regarding diagnoses and medication and other treat-
ments. But there are more subtle issues as well, such as names of
providers, details of an EMR user interface protected by vendor agree-
ments, and non-text indicators (such as “warning” icons) that can be-
tray confidential patient details.
A measurement methodology needs to respect these privacy constraints—
either by putting cumbersome measurements in place to ensure that
private data is never leaked throughout the analysis process, or by au-
tomatically redacting it in the first place. However, any such redaction
system needs to be effective in two ways: both at removing sensitive
information, but also at retaining (in conjunction with end-user feed-
back) the system behavior information we were trying to measure in
the first place.
Context Preservation Traditional work on privacy and confidentiality seeks
to hide information. However, to fulfill their purpose of tuning and
analysis, redacted medical screenshots still need to contain information—
a blacked-out screen would preserve all privacy, but be useless. We need
to balance hiding of privacy-protected information with communication
workflow process context.
System Impact Medical enterprises deploy IT in order to further their
medical mission, within the constraints of various business objectives.
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Ameasurement methodology needs to respect these deployment constraints—
it cannot make assumptions about underlying applications, operating
systems, access to source code, access to structured protocol commu-
nications, even access to documentation. Furthermore, a measurement
methodology cannot disrupt the underlying system; besides impeding
enterprise mission, changes might also invalidate necessary certification.
Workflow Impact For clinicians using medical IT systems, the primary
motivation is helping patients rather than wrestling with computing
systems—even to document troublesome scenarios in order to enable
these systems to be fixed. Consequently, a measurement methodology
needs to minimize the work required by these users: they should be
able to quickly log some issue, and move on with their real mission.
This Paper. In this paper, we present our research addressing these needs:
instrumentation that captures text-redacted keyboard/video/mouse (KVM)
traces—the point where humanspace and cyberspace [1] intersect. By cap-
turing data at the KVM interface and text-redacting images, we eliminate
software interface dependencies. Section 2 provides an overview of our pro-
totype system. Section 3 describes our methodologies for text redaction.
Section 4 describes the broader system we built around these techniques.
Section 5 evaluates the effectiveness of our approaches. Section 6 presents
how this work can impact real-world medical informatics systems. Section 7
reviews related work, and Section 8 concludes.
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2. System Overview
Our prototype system applies text and image redaction to KVM feeds
from medical informatics systems—see Figure 1.
Our system includes functionality essential to implementing screen cap-
ture for sensitive systems. The basic steps of instrumenting such systems in-
clude screen capture, image processing and editing, and data sharing. After
capture, the system processes an image to find and redact text.Additionally,
the system may search for regions within the image that match a set of im-
age snippets or “templates” and count, redact, or unredact matching regions.
Finally, a user may wish to edit the image and further redact or unredact a
portion of the processed screenshot.
Implementation. The bulk of our system implementation relies on a mixture
of C and C++ code spanning multiple open-source libraries and custom-
developed libraries and applications, including boost [2], C++ STL [3], OpenCV [4],
liblinear [5], and CGAL [6, 7, 8]. Altogether, we implemented approximately
9000 lines of code.
To remain system-independent, we implemented certain functionality with
higher-level APIs; our development environment is a MacBook Pro running
OS X 10.5 with 8 GB of memory.2 Certain, low-level OpenCV routines
rely on system libraries, but these are transparent to our code—OpenCV is
cross-platform.
Screen Capture. Our system relies on a virtual network computer (VNC)
arrangement to capture screen material from a remote host [9]. In a nut-
2We upgraded to OS X 10.6 midway through development and analysis.
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Figure 1: Our measurement module listens to keyboard and mouse input from devices and
video output received by the computer—and consequently remains system independent
and accommodates closed and certified systems.
shell, VNC defines a protocol for transporting a computer’s framebuffer,
keyboard, and mouse data over the network. By building a system with this
protocol, our system can capture and operate on all KVM events in a system-
independent fashion. In our test configuration, Mac OS X 10.6 functions as
the “Capture System” and the application x11vnc [10] running on an Ubuntu
Linux 9.10 running within a VMware [11] instance serves as the “Capture
Target.” The client implements read-only functionality and therefore does
not pass keyboard or mouse events from the VNC client to the VNC server.
Our client connects to the VNC server using TCP. After connecting, the
endpoints proceed through a handshake phase and negotiate the protocol ver-
sion “RFB 003.008\n” and the “raw” pixel format to transfer screen updates
from the server to the client without compression.
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3. Text Redaction Approaches
Text redaction is a fundamental aspect of the system because it removes
sensitive text from screen capture data, relieving the end-user from manually
redacting screen captures before sharing. By default, our approach imple-
mented a “deny-all” policy and thus redacts all text it finds. An end-user can
then “unredact” small regions as necessary to facilitate their conversation.
Because redaction affects just text and a small number of icons, our intention
is that screen context remains despite removal of potentially sensitive data.
In a different approach to redaction, our system could simply redact an en-
tire screen (e.g., turn the entire screen black) and the end-user could unredact
whichever small piece supports their needs. We believe this approach pro-
vides too little screen context to observers, and would require too much work
from end-users. Unredacted, unsensitive screen data provides context to ap-
plication stakeholders that may help focus their discussion.
Image-based text redaction consists of two principal steps: finding text in
an image, also known as text segmentation, and recoloring segmented image
regions to “remove” text. (We note that such segmentation is also the first
step of optical character recognition.) Redacting images using this approach
ensures that no “hidden” text or other data exists within the final redacted
product (as often plagues redaction in standard office document formats).
For automatic text redaction, we explored two approaches: Canny Edge
Detection [12], which aims to bound text with boxes, and Gabor-wavelet
[13] filtering, which aims to classify individual pixels as “text” or “non-text.”
For Gabor, we looked at both unsupervised classification and supervised
classification [14].
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3.1. Canny Edge Detection
In order to be legible, screenshot text exists with an intensity contrast in
relation to its background and thus creates gradient high points. The Canny
approach analyzes an image’s intensity gradient and marks edges at gradient
high points—thus (in theory) segmenting screenshot text.
First, we convert a color screenshot to 8-bit gray scale. We then apply
a Gaussian blur using a 3x3 window to reduce image noise—Canny output
qualitatively contained less noise with this initial blurring step. Next, we ex-
ecuted Canny using low and high threshold values of 100 and 300 respectively
to find edges—the values provide qualitatively-reasonable redaction results
for a variety of desktop screenshots. Gradient magnitudes greater than the
high threshold are considered edges and traced throughout the image. Val-
ues above the low threshold denote edges that branch from an existing trace
process. Together, these tunable values reduce noise during edge detection.
After executing the Canny algorithm, we find connected components
(polygons) using Canny output and an algorithm suitable for doing so [15].
For each polygon discovered, we compute a bounding rectangle and draw a
filled version of the rectangle into an image “redaction mask.” Finally, the
redaction mask is applied to the original image to produce a redacted image.
Figure 2 shows examples from our prototype. Unfortunately, standard
practice in commercial EMR prevents customers from disclosing user inter-
face details (e.g., see [16]), so we cannot actually show the screenshots we
used in our experiments.
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Undetected line
Rectangle-enclosed rectangles
Redacted entire globe
White space between words
Undetected line
Rectangle-enclosed rectangles
Redacted entire globe
White space between words
Undetected line
Rectangle-enclosed rectangles
Redacted entire globe
White space between words
Figure 2: Canny-based text redaction. The top image is a screenshot snippet from the
Wikipedia page about Canny edge detection [17] (recall that contractual obligations pre-
vent us from disclosing the EMR screenshots we tested on). The second image depicts the
rectangles that result from processing the first image with Canny edge detection, polygon
detection, and polygon bounding with rectangles. The third image derives from filling the
rectangles in the second image and then applying the second image as a redaction mask
to the first. Canny missed some true edges throughout the image (false negatives for edge
detection) and added edges where text does not exist near the globe (false positive for text
detection). Finally, notice whitespace between words and tiny rectangles enclosed within
larger ones.
3.2. Gabor Filters
In general, a wavelet is a wave with some orientation and frequency that
when convolved with an image, resonates and creates a detectable signal.
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Gabor wavelets, which are commonly used in image processing, are com-
prised of a sine wave modulated by a Gaussian envelope; for our application,
they use a two-dimensional envelope. Both real and imaginary components
comprise the wavelet, but we follow the model of Jain and Bhattarchee [14]
and only use the real, symmetric (cosine) component. When an individual
filter is convolved with an image, our system extrapolates border pixels to
increase the image size and prevent the filter from “falling off” the image
edge (other extrapolation approaches failed in our experiments).
Using a bank of filters enables detection of image features of different
frequencies and orientations. In the wavelets we used in our application,
we considered five standard deviations of the Gaussian (again following Jain
and Bhattarchee). This left us two tunable parameters for wavelet functions:
wavelength (λ) and orientation (θ). Through qualitative analysis, we settled
on parameters
λ ∈ {.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0, 16.0, 32.0}
and
θ ∈ {0.0, 45.0, 90.0, 135.0}
for a filter-bank size of 28 filters (|λ| × |θ|).
Like Jain and Bhattarchee, we vary the parameter θ to detect signals
oriented in a uniform variety of positions. However, unlike them, we chose λ
to vary by powers of 2 in order to form a dyadic collection of filters that span
a collection of feature sizes. Through qualitative experiments, we found our
chosen values to detect features among a collection of screenshots.
Feature Vectors. We apply a Gabor wavelet filter by first convolving the
image with this wavelet function.
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If we have a bank of n filters, we then have n filtered images, yielding
(after thresholding) an n-dimensional vector for each pixel in the image. We
then append each pixel’s x and y position to each vector, and shift each
vector to zero mean and unit standard deviation. Thus, applying a bank of
n filters yields an n+ 2-dimensional feature vector for each pixel.
3.3. Classification
Once we’ve used our bank of Gabor filters to turn each pixel into a feature
vector, we then need to determine which vectors represent text pixels and
which represent non-text.
Unsupervised Classification. In our first approach, we use the k-means algo-
rithm [18] to cluster features into k classes, where k ∈ {2, 3}. The algorithm
assigns each pixel a class label i ∈ [0, k − 1], where one class may correspond
to text if text exists. (In our qualitative experiments, we found that some
screenshots clustered better visually into k = 2 classes and others into k = 3
classes.)
During k-means clustering, the system relied on stopping conditions of
the first of 10000 iterations or an error rate of .0001. We chose the initial
cluster centers using a more recent technique [19] and ran the algorithm
one time to the stopping conditions before assigning labels. After running
k-means, the label i corresponding to text must be chosen manually. The
designated “text” pixels form a mask that redacts text when combined with
the original image.
Supervised Classification. The downside to unsupervised classification is multi-
fold: k and i are chosen manually; the approach classifies pixels into k clusters
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whether or not text exists; and k-means clustering can be slow (particularly
with a feature count easily surpassing one million with modern screen reso-
lutions).
To address these issues, we also tried supervised classification. Instead of
using k-means, we feed each feature vector to a trained classifier that labels
the pixel as “text” or “not text.” All pixels labeled as “text” are converted
to the color black; all other pixels maintain their values.
We chose a linear support vector machine (SVM) to label pixels as mem-
bers of classes {−1, 1}.
We experimented with two classifiers (a) L1-regularized L2-loss support
vector classification and (b) L1-regularized logistic regression. We chose these
classifiers because after training, they can contain a 0-valued parameter for
each feature that remained unused during the training process. Such fea-
tures can be eliminated from input during future predictions and thus not
computed in the first place. Their absence reduces computational overhead
in the running system. (Interestingly, in our tests with EMR screenshots,
only one feature was not used).
To begin machine learning, we first partition our set of screenshots into
a training set and testing set. Then to train the classifier, we generate a set
of ground-truth feature vectors and labels from the training set. We gen-
erate ground-truth by manually choosing the features and labels associated
with “best” redaction results using the unsupervised classification technique
described above. This ground-truth is fed into a program we implemented
that interfaces with the liblinear library [5] to train and save the resultant
classifier. The classifier can then be run on any image using another program
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we wrote to classify pixels as {−1, 1} and thus redact text.
During the SVM training process, we used default liblinear values for
all SVM parameters. We experimented with cross-validation to tune the
constant C in the SVM expression (see liblinear for details [5]). However,
we experienced minimal performance improvements and therefore relied on
default values to train each classifier.
4. Experimental Tools
Section 3 above described our approaches to automatic text redaction.
However, for both EMR clinicians as well as system experimenters, it’s im-
portant to keep users in the loop. This present section describes two tools
we built for this purpose.
4.1. Tool: scrubs
Our scrubs tool (Figure 3) captures and redacts screenshot images dy-
namically, in real time, uaing Canny. Our prototype uses x11vnc [10],
pthreads [20] and the RFB protocol [9].
When an EMR user decides some sequence of activity should be logged for
later analysis, it’s possible that automatic redaction may remove too much
information (such as non-sensitive text that would help illuminate the issue
requiring analysis) or too little (such as a sensitive logo or image). Conse-
quently, our scrubs tool also provides an edit mode, which pauses display
of screen updates and allows the user to click and drag the mouse to define
custom redaction and/or unredaction rectangles (Figure 4). While paused
for user edits, the system continually processes and maintains received screen
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scrubs
Log
automatic
redaction
Displayvideo source
interactive tools
custom unredaction
custom redaction
Figure 3: Our scrubs tool enables automatic redaction, interactively tunable, in real time.
Custom redacted region
Custom unredacted regions
Figure 4: Our scrubs tool automatically applies redaction, and then permits custom redac-
tion and unredaction.
updates in the background, and upon returning to record mode, the system
displays a compilation of all updates processed during pause.
4.2. Tool: five in one
The Canny Edge approach to text redaction (Section 3.1) overlays a
screenshot image with rectangles marking regions of potential text. In our
experiments on EMR screenshots, we found that the resulting set of rectan-
gles could often benefit from additional massaging. Thus, for the purpose
of exploration and for end-user use, we developed a tool called “five in one”
(Figure 5). This tool permits a wide range of interactive operations, in-
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five_in_one
Log
automatic
(Canny) redaction
Displayimagesource
interactive tools
rectangle merging,
editing, etc
template creationfive_in_one 
templates
Figure 5: Our five in one tool enables experiments and end users to analyze and edit the
rectangular regions of potential text flagged by Canny redaction, and to generate and
apply templates.
cluding merging, copying and deleting rectangles; toggling display between
transparent and solid rectangles; generating (and then automatically apply-
ing) redaction templates; overlaying with a grid; and thinning out redundant
rectangles. Figure 6 shows one example.
5. Evaluation
To evaluate our system, we looked at the relative effectiveness of the
two approaches to automatic redaction (Section 5.1 and Section 5.2) and at
non-text aspects of privacy preservation (Section 5.3). We also looked at
effectiveness of context preservation (Section 5.4), as well as basic computa-
tional costs (Section 5.5).
For our empirical analysis, we used a corpus of 80 screenshots from EMR
systems at two large healthcare providers. As we noted earlier, although the
datasets contain fake patient data, the donor organizations still considered
the details sensitive, so we cannot publicly show them. In one dataset, images
were in PNG format, RGB color, and were approximately 1500× 1900 pixels
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Begin in edit mode
Toggle ‘T’ to thin
Superfluous rectangles subsumed
Enlarged rectangles
Begin in edit mode
Toggle ‘T’ to thin
Superfluous rectangles subsumed
Enlarged rectangles
Superflous 
rectangles 
subsumed
Figure 6: As one example of five in one editing, a user can clean up the redaction rectangles
produced by Canny (left) by thinning out superfluous rectangles (in this case, reducing
the count about 75% from 969 to 237) and then enlarging the remaining rectangles one
pixel at a time.
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Figure 7: Measures of the visual complexity of our EMR datasets: Canny redaction
rectangles, sorted (left); normalized color variety (right).
and 1-1.5 MB each. In another, images were also PNG and RGB, but 1680×
1080 pixels and 230-390 KB. Due to their sensitive nature, we stored the
corpus in an AES-encrypted disk volume.
Figure 7 illustrates the complexity of the datasets according to the num-
ber of redaction rectangles generated for each screenshot.
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5.1. Canny
Our testing showed that Canny-based text redaction requires improve-
ments before the system can apply it meaningfully to EHR datasets.
The Canny approach had several problems. It generated redaction rectan-
gles that cover large parts of the screen, reduce potentially useful, non-private
screenshot context. (Occasionally, Canny even redacted the entire screen!)
The Canny approach also sometimes found interior edges of letters such as
“p” which produce very small rectangles embedded in larger ones. Canny left
whitespace between words, which may enable word-based frequency analy-
sis that reveals redacted text. Canny also tended to miss some text (false
negatives) while redacting some non-text (false positives). Figure 2 shows ex-
amples of whitespace and false positive issues; Figure 8 shows false negative
and spuriously large rectangle issues.
Our analysis did suggest ways that Canny redaction could be tuned to be
usable for this application. We can eliminate rectangles that cover all or most
of the screen, and (as Figure 9 shows) rectangles that contain a large number
of the other rectangles. As Figure 10 shows, we can also identify (and then
merge) rectangles that are close enough vertically to be considered on the
same “text line,” but whose horizontal gap is small enough to be considered
whitespace.
As Figure 6 noted, even manual editing with our five in one tool could
reduce the rectangle count by 75%. Reducing rectangle count can reduce
the latency of subsequent processing steps that involve all Canny rectangles,
such as rendering rectangles in an image or analyzing and merging adjacent
words.
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Detected large rectangle
Undetected text
Figure 8: Canny redaction on a gmail inbox shows both spurious large redaction rectangles
as well as missed text.
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wholly within a given redaction rectangle.
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5.2. Gabor
Visually, Gabor-filtering redacts more precisely than Canny-based filter-
ing. Unlike the Canny-based approach, Gabor fills whitespace between words
and redacts fractional characters. Gabor also redacts fewer non-text objects
(such as the Wikipedia globe, in a non-EMR example we showed) and did
not erroneously redact large rectangles from the screenshot, as Canny-based
redaction did.
Qualitative Analysis. Figure 11 revisits Figure 2 using Gabor-based redaction
where k = 2 and i = 0 and Figure 12 revisits Figure 8 using k = 2 and i = 1.
In Figure 11, note how Gabor-based redaction fills whitespace between words
in sentences, does not redact objects such as the globe, and does redact
fractional characters. It does not redact large rectangles from the screen as
Canny-based redaction. In Figure 12, note how the system failed to redact
text with certain font scales and textures in the upper left corner and also
throughout lighter message-body in the message lines.
Quantitative Analysis for Unsupervised. To evaluate unsupervised Gabor
redaction, we chose a few representative but dissimilar (using the metric we
present below, in Section 5.4) screenshots from dataset 1. For each screen-
shot, we chose the unsupervised redaction that looked best qualitatively, and
then manually counted the text characters missed by redaction. In these
screenshots, the character counts ranged from 1094 to 2145. False nega-
tives (characters entirely unredacted) ranged from 0.036% to 2.7%; partial
false negatives (characters with at least one pixel left unredacted) ranged
from 1.7% to 4.3%. We did not count false positives because they represent
non-characters, and would require counting pixels to be meaningful.
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Fractional characters redacted
Reduced whitespace between words
Does not redact entire globe
Figure 11: Gabor-based redaction does not redact large objects such as the globe, connects
whitespace between words in sentences, and redacts fractional characters found at the edge
of the screenshot.
Undetected text
Partially redacted text
Figure 12: Gabor-based redaction missed the large gmail text and small “by Google” text
below the gmail text. It partially redacted lighter message text in the inbox. Note that
Gabor-based redaction did not compute a large rectangle of false positives as Canny did
on the same image.
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Figure 13: Effectiveness Gabor-based text redaction. We trained a liblinear L1-regularized
logistic regression classifier on on dataset 1 and applied it to dataset 2; in both cases, we
used the qualitatively best unsupervised Gabor redaction as “ground truth” labeling.
Quantitative Analysis for Supervised. As Section 3.3 above discussed, we
started by running unsupervised Gabor on dataset 1 and, for each screen-
shot, choosing the qualitatively best result as “ground truth,” and used these
labels to train the L1-regularized logistic regression classifier on dataset 1.
To evaluate supervised Gabor classification, we then applied this trained
classifier to dataset 2, and compared the results against the “ground truth”
obtained by running our unsupervised Gabor variations on each screenshot
and qualitatively choosing the best one.
The mean classification performance is 95.2% with a stddev of .953%
and a minimum performance value of 93.2%—larger minima are better than
smaller ones. The mean false-negative rate is .307% with a stddev of .338%
and a maximum value of 1.4%—smaller maxima are better than larger ones.
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5.3. Non-Text Information Leakage
Our experiments also revealed ways in which redacted EMR screenshots
still revealed possibly sensitive information. The positioning of redacted
text within a page can betray information, as can similarities and differ-
ences between successive lines of redacted text. A tick-box with a redacted
“checkmark” is still distinguishable from unchecked box; visual “alerts” such
as red exclamation points or yellow-highlighted text also convey potentially
sensitive information.
To address these concerns, we explored techniques to normalize redaction
rectangles against a background grid, to identify and redact specific icon
templates, and to identify and redact specific colors (e.g., red). The first
author’s thesis [21] has more information.
5.4. Context Preservation
As the introduction noted, traditional approaches to privacy and confi-
dentiality seek to hide information. However, for our EMR capture tool to
be useful, we also need to preserve information: the context of the EMR
screenshot involved.
To quantitatively evaluate how well our techniques work at preserving
context, we looked at two ways of measuring differentiating information be-
tween pairs of redacted screenshots.
In the first approach, we measured the fraction of overlapping text-
redacted pixels in an image pair. With this metric, changes accumulate only
when a pair of pixels exist, at least one pixel of the pair begins non-black,
and both pixels are redacted. When one or both pixels begin non-black and
the pixels correspond to text, redaction removes differentiating information
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by converting both values to black. Removing information reduces differ-
entiating screenshot context. Taken to the limit, redaction blackens each
screenshot entirely and leaves no differentiating information.
Looking at all pairs of screenshots in dataset 1, the mean fraction of over-
lapping, redacted text is 9.3% with a standard deviation of 3.5%; for pairs of
identical screenshots, 23.7% and 3.6%. Redaction preserves 90% of differen-
tiating information in all pairs and 76% in pairs of identical screenshots—on
average, redaction affects no more than 24% of the pixels in any screenshot.
In our second approach, we computed a distance between two screenshots
by counting the number of pixels that match within the pair. Because EHR
screenshots are nearly identical in size and aligned in content (e.g., items such
as menus are not pixel-shifted among screenshots) this measurement gives a
notion of similarity that enables useful pairwise-screenshot comparisons (as
we qualitatively validated). Figure 14 shows the results of text redaction
in similarity of over 1275 screenshot pairs of dataset 1 (we excluded pairs
of identical screenshots). Overall, redaction has little impact on pairwise
screenshot similarity with changes ranging from 2% to 15%. Text redaction
retains potentially important context in the EMR screenshots.
5.5. Latency
The principal computational component of our system consisted of text
redaction.
To measure latency of text redaction, we used a a MacBook Pro running
Mac OS X 10.7 with 8 GB of memory serves as the experimental platform.
An AES-256-encrypted disk image stores image, feature, and label files as-
sociated with redaction. To obtain timing information, we used dtrace and
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1. Fractions that fall above the horizontal line correspond to screenshots that are more
similar after redaction.
0.096
2.077
2.077
0.009
0.722
0.017
mean stddev
Sup. Gabor
Unsup. Gabor
Canny 0.365
13.12
4.569
0.004
0.181
0.033
mean stddev
Normalize
Build
Set up
5.987
0.226
0.407
0.069
mean stddev
Labels
Features
latency to classify pixels (seconds) latency to generate elements for 28 Gabor filters (seconds)
latency to load Gabor elements 
from file on disk (seconds)
Table 1: Our measured costs of redaction.
programmatically printed timing information. All file loads were measured
using a cold file cache. Table 1 shows the results.
6. Improving Real-World Systems
We designed our system within the context of a larger vision: a privacy-
protected “logging Service” that interacts with a monitored system, a “shar-
ing Service” that functions as a repository for application stakeholders to
share redacted screenshots, a monitored system with developers and main-
tainers, and an end-user who wishes their system to be monitored and a
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web-browser through which the end-user can interact with logging and shar-
ing services. In a sample usage scenario, an end-user triggers the “Logging
Service” to log a monitored host; the “Logging Service” connects to the mon-
itored host and begins logging with automatic redaction; when the end-user
detects a scenario she wishes to bring to the attention of the system engi-
neers, she reviews, edits, and possibly unredacts the logged screenshot and
then shares it with the system engineers.
In our long-term vision, the fruit of this work can enable empirical feed-
back paths between application stakeholders. Developers, administrators,
end-users, organizations that produce or deploy a particular system, and leg-
islators or governance bodies that create rules to govern systems all represent
different types of stakeholders. With established feedback paths, such stake-
holders can begin to understand empirically the day-to-day, system-effects of
their decisions.
A simple capture system can also provide direct value to end-users by en-
dowing them with a larger, empirical role in the software maintenance cycle.
They can capture, annotate, and share problems, configurations, ideas, bugs,
and other captured scenarios with stakeholders. They can inform existing ad
hoc stakeholder interactions such as online support forums and help-desk in-
teractions with rich, contextual data. Additionally, end-users can use traces
as visual web search keys during their own investigations.
Playing a larger role in the software maintenance cycle can motivate end-
users to share their findings continually: if end-users believe and experience
that their contributions make a positive difference to their workflow, end-
users may be motivated to contribute further. Consequently, organizations
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may improve empirical insight into their information security systems and
associated risk calculations. When organizations lack the expertise to analyze
traces in-house, they could hire third parties to do so.
7. Related Work
Our work combines existing technologies of screen capture and computer
vision with a goal of improving the quality of communications among appli-
cation stakeholders and ultimately, improving our understanding of “usable
security.” Many research and commercial products implement pieces of our
work in isolation and for different purposes.
Screen Capture. The MIT Sikuli research project combines computer vision
and programming to enable users to create machine-independent, visually-
programmed and actuated programs [22]. A commercial product call egg-
Plant also allows developers to test GUIs with machine-independent, au-
tomation scripts [23]. Many screen capture applications such as Snipping
Tool [24], Snapz Pro X [25], and xwd [26] exist. Some programs capture still
screenshots, others capture both stills and video, and some allow end-users
to annotate captures.
Our system captures data and modifies it with text redaction—we use
screen captures for a different purpose than these works.
Segmenting Text. Many commercial and free-software tools such as Gimp [27],
Photoshop [28], Aperture [29], Final Cut Studio [30], Pixelmator [31], and
Imagemagick [32] allow one to paint, create, touch up, and modify still im-
ages and/or video. These applications could be used to manually redact text
from a screenshot.
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Our work builds on existing text segmentation research [14] to redact text
automatically from screenshots.
Google Goggles can extract and recognize text from natural scenery for
purposes such as language translation among many others [33]. The scope of
our system is limited to computer screenshots. However, screenshots taken
with a camera may include angles and lighting similar to the natural scenery
submitted to Google Goggles.
User Studies. Google’s in-house UseTube [34] supports employees who wish
to perform user studies of any network-connected computer; it simplifies the
act of performing, archiving, and accessing user studies.
Deidentifying Data. In the medical domain, a large body of work relates
to deidentifying protected health information (PHI) in electronic documents
once it is already in text format [35, 36]. Our work approaches the deidenti-
fication problem from a complementary angle. Our system does not interpret
data; rather, it redacts all text within an application screenshot and allows
a domain expert to unredact portions relevant to their needs.
Document redaction products such as Rapid Redact [37] and brava! [38]
exist in the commercial marketplace. These products parse document struc-
ture and can help users achieve WYSIWYG. In contrast, our system redacts
material from images directly (there is typically no hidden structure).
Anonymity. Deidentified data records can still contain visual information
that reveals sensitive data. Research in the context of databases that contain
a mix of sensitive and unsensitive records explored the concepts k -anonymity
[39] and l -diversity [40].
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In some circumstances, redacted text in our system may suffer from a
visual form of the k -anonymity problem; these techniques may apply in our
setting.
Document Analysis. The International Conference on Document Analysis
and Recognition (ICDAR) has many papers and competitions related to the
problem applying machine learning and computer vision to analyze docu-
ments analysis [41]. A 2003 competition sponsored by ICDAR has datasets
available for optical character recognition (OCR), word recognition, text lo-
cating, and other purposes [42]. These datasets do not apply directly to our
problem; we segment text, in some cases have a more constrained segmenta-
tion problem, and do not apply OCR.
8. Conclusion
Effective usability engineering in any system requires closing the loop,
so users can easily identify and communicate troublesome scenarios. In an
interactive electronic system, a natural way to do this is via screenshots.
In EMR and EHR, privacy concerns require that any such screenshots have
sensitive data redacted and the logistics of certified commercial medical IT
require that any solution not touch the internals of the software.
To address these concerrns, we have designed, built, described, and em-
pirically analyzed a system that allows end-users to take screen captures on
sensitive systems. The system automatically redacts screenshot text and al-
lows end-users to fine-tune redacted results for their needs. The automated
redaction process requires no end-user intervention. We evaluated our sys-
tem using a corpus of screenshots from EMR systems at two large medical
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facilities.
Potential areas for future work include improving Canny for general-
purpose use, implementing predicate matching to process screenshots ac-
cording to logical conditions, building a larger ground-truth data corpus,
building system components for sharing redacted screenshots, and deploying
the system in a real user environment.
Ultimately, our redaction system can facilitate data-driven communica-
tions among application stakeholders and guide system evolution to address
stakeholder needs. With accurate and timely tuning enabled by our work,
stakeholders can achieve and maintain usable and secure systems in practice.
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